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Abstract
Much of recent success in multiagent reinforcement
learning has been in two-player zero-sum games. In
these games, algorithms such as fictitious self-play
and minimax tree search can converge to an approx-
imate Nash equilibrium. While playing a Nash equi-
librium strategy in a two-player zero-sum game is op-
timal, in an n-player general sum game, it becomes a
much less informative solution concept. Despite the
lack of a satisfying solution concept, n-player games
form the vast majority of real-world multiagent sit-
uations. In this paper we present a new frame-
work for research in reinforcement learning in n-player
games. We hope that by analyzing behavior learned
by agents in these environments the community can
better understand this important research area and
move toward meaningful solution concepts and re-
search directions. The implementation and additional
information about this framework can be found at
https://colosseumrl.igb.uci.edu.
Introduction
Recently, reinforcement learning has had success beat-
ing humans in 2-player zero-sum games such as Go (Sil-
ver et al. 2018), Starcraft (Vinyals et al. 2019), and
Poker (Brown and Sandholm 2018). Two-player zero
sum games have many nice properties that make train-
ing a reinforcement learning agent for them relatively
straightforward. Mainly, playing a Nash equilibrium
strategy in zero-sum two-player games is optimal, and
in the worst case results in a tie. This fact forms the
basis of most current algorithms in this domain, such as
Monte Carlo tree search (Browne et al. 2012) and coun-
terfactual regret minimization (Zinkevich et al. 2008).
While most empirical and theoretical success has
come in zero-sum two-player games, we rarely find ex-
amples of these games in practical problems. Much
more often we have scenarios with more than two
agents, and where one agents success is not necessar-
ily another agents failure. These n-player general sum
games include scenarios such as self-driving cars, mar-
ketplaces, robotic teams, and the global economy. Un-
fortunately, the Nash equilibrium solution concept does
not provide a satisfying solution to these n-player zero
sum games. Besides being intractable to compute, a
Nash equilibrium strategy has each player playing a
best response to all the other players in that current
strategy. Another way to put this is that no player has
incentive to unilaterally deviate. However, if two play-
ers deviate at the same time, they could be better off
than if they hadn’t. For example, in three-player Kuhn
poker, one Nash equilibrium has the first two players
getting negative utility and the third player getting pos-
itive utility. Neither the first or second player is incen-
tivized to unilaterally deviate, but if they both deviate
they could end up with positive utility. Furthermore,
even if every player plays a Nash equilibrium strategy,
their combined strategy might not be a Nash equilib-
rium strategy. Currently, there is no satisfying theoret-
ical solution concept in n-player general sum games.
Although the theory behind n-player general sum
games is lacking, in practice many of the same algo-
rithms that find success in two-player zero-sum games
such as CFR, tree search and self-play can find very
good strategies in n-player general sum games. Per-
haps the most well-known example of this is Pluribus
(Brown and Sandholm 2019), the algorithm that beat
the top human players in multiplayer poker using the
same techniques from the two-player superhuman algo-
rithm Libratus. Pluribus is conjectured to be highly
exploitable, but it is still able to beat the best humans
at multiplayer poker. How is this possible? What can
we learn from solutions found from traditional meth-
ods when used in the n-player general sum setting? We
believe that these questions need to be emphasized in
the multiagent reinforcement learning community. To
that end, we have created a framework for reinforce-
ment learning in n-player general sum games. This
framework includes a number of new n-player game en-
vironments such as Blokus, Tron, and 3/4 player tic-
tac-toe as well as traditional normal form games and
Kuhn poker. Our hope is that by comparing learning
approaches and algorithms against each other in these
environments we can better understand the dynamics
of n-player games and start to discover relevant solution
concepts.
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ColosseumRL
We introduce a multi agent framework designed to allow
researchers to tackle the challenges presented. Colos-
seum is a reinforcement learning framework that in-
cludes several environments, a unified format for adding
new environments, and a distributed competition server
for testing and evaluation. The matchmaking system
allows for multi agent competitions to be executed in
a distributed manner, allowing the evaluation of large
populations of agents.
Environments
Currently, Colosseum has three implemented compet-
itive n-player environments. We also define a generic
framework for defining n-player games with potential
imperfect information that will automatically integrate
with the evaluation features.
Tic-Tac-Toe
We extend the notion of Tic-Tac-Toe to n-player
games by using identical rules to regular tic-tac-toe and
introducing additional symbols for players. We create
an n × m board use the symbols X,O, Y, Z, . . . in or-
der to label the players. The goal for every player is to
attain three of their symbols sequentially in any cardi-
nal or inter-cardinal direction. The winner of the game
is the player that achieves this configuration first, and
all of the other players are equal losers. Rewards for
this game are r = 0 for a regular action, 1 for win-
ning, and −1 for losing. The observation for this game
is the entire game board, with no obscured informa-
tion. This game is a perfect information game with a
relatively small game tree, meaning that agents may
search essentially all possibilities given enough compu-
tation time. Tic-Tac-Toe represents a good challenge
for multi-agent reinforcement learning due to the pres-
ence of king-maker scenarios: states of the game where
one player has no possibility of winning but they may
decide which of the other two players would win. This
challenges tree search algorithms because it undermines
the notion of optimal play in all scenarios.
Blokus
Blokus is a strategy board game where the players’
goal is to gain maximum control over the board. Blokus
has a maximum of 4 players, each receiving one of every
possible polyominos ranging one to five sections each.
Players may place these polyominos in any diagonally
adjacent location to the pieces they already have. Every
time a player places a block, they gain control over the
number of sections that block contained; for example,
large pentonimos give five control whereas the smaller
dominos only give two. Rewards for this game are equal
to the amount of control received for each move, or 0
if no more moves are possible. At the end of the game,
players are given a ranking from first to fourth based on
their total control. The observations for this environ-
ment are the entire board and the pieces each player has
remaining; and, since it is a sequential board game, it
is again fully observable with perfect information. Al-
though Blokus only has a maximum of four players, it
posses interesting challenges for reinforcement learning
due to the area control aspect of the game. It is easy
for players to form short term alliances by focusing their
control efforts on a single player and avoiding blocking
each other’s possible moves. Also, although the game
is perfect information and sequential, the large action
spaces makes simple search algorithm infeasible for find-
ing optimal agents.
Tron
Tron is simple n-player grid based video game. The
game consists of an K×M arena with surrounding walls
and N players initially starting in an circle around the
arena. Players may move forward, left, or right and
when doing so, leave behind a trailing wall. Players
are eliminated if they crash into either the arena wall,
another player’s wall, or their own wall. The goal of
the game is to force your opponents to crash into a
wall by limiting their movement options. The game
supports arbitrarily high number of players as well as
teams of multiple players. The rewards are 1 for sur-
viving an action, −1 for crashing, and 10 for achieving
first place without a tie. At the end of the game, players
are ranked (with possible ties) based on the order that
they crashed. The observation for Tron may either be
the entire game board or a small window around only
the given player. Tron may also either be played se-
quentially for a perfect information variant of the game
or it can be played simultaneously to mimic the real
game. Tron is an interesting game to study MARL on
because it is easily extendable to many players, features
an area control mechanic that allows players to form
short-term alliances, and allows for a large of amount
of simple variations.
Normal Form Games
Random Payoff Matrix For theoretical explo-
ration, we implement games with randomly generated
payoff matrices. We define each environment with a
payoff matrix M ∈ RS1,S2,...,SP ,P , where P is the num-
ber of players and Si is the number of possible actions
for player i. The payouts for each action are randomly
generated from a uniform distribution on [0, 1), and we
include an option to ensure that the game will always
be zero-sum. The observation for this environment is
the entire normal form game matrix, and the action for
each agent is a number from 0 to Si.
Rock Paper Scissors A classical environment from
game theory is Rock Paper Scissors, which servers as a
common baselines for evolutionary mechanics. We pro-
vide both the traditional two player rock paper scissors
as well as a generalization of the game to three players.
This generalization, created by Bernard Koven (Koven
2014), extends the rules so that the winner of any game
is the player with the single unique action out of the
three players. If all three players have the same action
or all three are unique, then the game is a tie. We allow
for user-defined payoff values for winning, losing, and
tying the game. The observation for this environment
is the normal form matrix given the payoff values, and
the actions for each players are the traditional Rock,
Paper, and Scissors.
Kuhn Poker A classical example of a partial infor-
mation environment from game theory is Kuhn Poker,
a simplified version of Texas Hold’em. The original ver-
sion of the game designed by (Kuhn 1951) and involves
two players with a maximum of three actions in a game.
A generalization of the mechanics to three players was
defined and studied by (Szafron, Gibson, and Sturte-
vant 2013). We further generalize the mechanics to
include an arbitrary N players, although the analogy
to Texas Hold’em breaks down with enormous player
counts. The deck of N player Kuhn Poker consists of
N + 1 cards labeled 0 to N . The game consists of two
rounds: If there is no outstanding bet, then a player
may either bet or check. If there is an outstanding bet,
then a player may either call or fold. If all players have
checked or a player has bet and at least one other has
called, then the participating player with the highest
card wins the entire pot. Reward is 0 for each action
and the change in net worth at the end of a game. Three
player Kuhn poker is one of the few non-trivial multi-
player games with known Nash equilibria.
Baselines
One major difficulty in multi agent reinforcement learn-
ing is finding good opponents to collect episodes from.
We may only train a competent agent if we have good
opponents to train on. We apply several standard mul-
tiplayer reinforcement learning techniques to examine
the difficulties of training in these MARL environments.
All of the agents are optimized using Proximal Policy
Optimization (Schulman et al. 2017) using the same
neural network, and we only vary the training strategy.
We focus on the simultaneous-action fully-observable
Tron environment for these test because it has a small
enough action and observation space for a network to
reliably learn but that is not trivial enough for tree
search. We use a tron board with size 15 × 15 and 4
players.
Fixed Opponent
We first train an agent using single player reinforcement
learning against a simple, hand-coded agent. This agent
moves forward if the path is clear, or randomly moves
either left or right if the path is clear in either direction.
We train a neural network on this fixed opponent to en-
sure that our PPO and network are capable of learning
the environment and task given a stationary opponent.
We test three different variants of these fixed agents. In
each variant, we change the probability that the agent
will perform a random action instead of the hand-coded
action. We set this probability to 5% (Sα), 25% (Sβ),
and 100% (Sγ).
Self Play
We also apply the common two-player tactic of de-
layed update self play (SP). In this technique, we train
against fixed copies of ourselves until the current agent
reaches a specified average win percentage. We then
update all of the opponent agents and repeat this train-
ing procedure on the new agents. This will allow the
agent to learn against better opponents than our hand-
coded option, but it also provides stability since we do
not update the opponents very often. We find that self
play converges to a stable agent within 1 to 2 million
time-steps. We try two different minimum win per-
centages for the update: 50% (SPα) and 80% (SPβ).
Lower update percentages produces quicker updates to
the opponents.
Fictitious Self Play
We also use an extended version of self play known as
fictitious self play (Heinrich, Lanctot, and Silver 2015).
In this variant, instead of only keeping track of the last
iteration of the target network, we keep the last K it-
erations and play against all of them. In each game,
each opponent has an 80% chance of being the latest
iteration of the policy and a 20% change of being one
of the other K − 1 iterations. This encourages diver-
sity in the opponent population and ensures that our
agent does not over-fit to itself. We again try update
percentages of 50% and 80% and population sizes of
K = 4 (FSPα, FSPβ) and K = 16 (FSPγ, FSPδ).
Higher populations should create more robust agents
since they have to maintain dominance against a wider
variety of opponents.
Evaluation
Another major difficulty in multi agent reinforcement
learning is the task of ranking a population of trained
agents. Simple round robin tournaments may results
in non-transitive relations between agents. It may be
difficult to find a single agent who beats all others, but
simply looking at each agents win count may not always
find the intuitively best agent either.
We provide a simple measure of agent performance
based on the probability of an agent finishing in a given
position. We run a tournament of 25, 000 games, in
which we uniformly sample the opponents from our 12
variations without replacement. From every game, we
receive a ranking for each agent based on when they
crashed into a wall. We collect the number of times each
Distribution of Rankings
Figure 1: The distribution of rankings each agent re-
ceived throughout tournament.
agent finished first, second, third, and fourth. We then
sort these agents based on their first place performance
and plot the times each agent achieved each ranking.
For model design, we flatten our board representa-
tion and stack the last three observations so the agent
has access to temporal information about the environ-
ment. We then feed this flattened observation into a
two layer feed forward network with hidden sizes of 512
and 256. Finally, we split this hidden vector into a
policy and value layer. We train each agent for 2.72
million timesteps with 5, 440 timesteps for each train-
ing iteration. Our network runs 16 iterations of of the
Adam Optimizer with an SGD batch size of 1024 for
each training batch.
We run a tournament featuring the three agents
trained on those fixed opponents, the two self-play
agents, and the four variations of fictitious self play
agents. We also include three variants of our fixed agent
to act as a sanity check for the other agents (Fα, Fβ,
Fγ). We note that if two players tied, for example if
they both crashed into a wall at the same time, their
rank is rounded down to the lowest nearest rank.
The results of the competition are showing in Figure
1. We see an interesting result that the agents trained
against only the fixed opponent with single player re-
inforcement learning performed the best. The self play
and fictitious self play policies performed less good, and
the fixed opponents were always last. This is a prelim-
inary analysis, and raises more questions than it an-
swers.
As an additional test, we ranked the agents using the
ranked pairs voting scheme (Tideman 1987). Ranked
pairs constructs an acyclic directed graph by sequen-
tially placing directed edges between agents in order of
their win percentage, checking that each edge does not
create a cycle. The rankings generated by this voting
scheme, in order from highest to lowest, are as follows:
{Sα, Sβ, FSPα, SPα, FSPδ, SPβ, FSPγ, Sγ, FSPβ,
Fβ, Fα, Fγ}.
Discussion
It is striking that even in the simplest possible n-player
games such as three-player tic-tac-toe, we don’t know
what an optimal strategy for an individual player is.
This is concerning because n-player games form the vast
majority of real-world multiagent systems. We believe
that the multiagent reinforcement learning community
needs to put much more emphasis on studying these
games and designing algorithms that learn how to play
optimally in these games. We also think that much
greater emphasis needs to be placed in this area on the
theoretical side from game theorists, both in defining
ranking and optimality concepts as well as developing
algorithms that create agents which achieve them.
In this paper we have mainly focused on the question
of how to design an optimal agent or rank agents in
general sum n-player games. Perhaps this is the wrong
question though. Maybe in real-world n-player scenar-
ios, finding the optimal strategy for each agent doesn’t
make sense. For example, in self-driving cars, we don’t
want to have each car get to their location the fastest
by endangering other cars. There is a large literature
in economics on social choice theory, which approaches
this problem from the perspective of a social planner.
It is possible that this is a more useful direction be-
cause the price of anarchy can be quite large in n-player
games. There is also much work done on cooperative
n-player games which might be helpful in this area. Fi-
nally, it is interesting to examine connections to other n-
player settings that are well-studied in economics such
as market design and mechanism design.
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